Weaponising Religion
the abuse of power
Introduction
In Buddhism, the first precept states: "I undertake the training to refrain from taking life", which applies to all living beings. This precept is one of the five basic moral commitments for all Buddhists. Dharma refers not only to the Buddha's teachings but also to the moral order that helps free people from suffering. However, Buddhist rulers have claimed the "defence of the Dharma" to justify killing. The Mahavamsa, a fifth-century Sri Lankan text, tells of King Dutugemunu being reassured that killing non-Buddhist enemies in battle hardly matters for his karma.
Does the "defence of the Dharma" justification undermine Buddhism's first precept? I argue it does jeopardise the precept because it contradicts Buddhism's commitment to intention, equivocates the meaning of Dharma, and violates the teaching of non-attachment. Attempts to balance non-violence with necessity jeopardise the first precept.
Section I examines intention in Buddhist ethics. Section II analyses the "defence of the Dharma" justification. Section III identifies philosophical flaws in this justification. Section IV presents my “Recursive Intention” experiment, which explains why this justification fails.
I
The first precept is not just a rule against killing; it is based on the intention behind actions. According to Buddhist psychology (Abhidharma), killing consists of five parts: (1) a living being, (2) knowing it is a living being, (3) the intention to kill, (4) the effort to kill, and (5) the resulting death. Karma, the moral causality of actions, is how the first precept is judged; fulfilling these conditions creates negative karma, regardless of outcomes. Canonical (included in the list of sacred books officially accepted as genuine) texts like the Pali Canon offer no exception for killing to defend the Dharma. Liberation from suffering, which the defence of the Dharma justification claims to build upon, cannot exist alongside the intention to kill. Killing is always an act driven by delusion, hatred, or greed. Therefore, the first precept is not a guideline that changes with context but an absolute value.
A counterargument can claim that Buddhist intention can refer to broader purposes rather than momentary mental states, allowing killing with "good intentions" like protecting Dharma. However, wholesome and unwholesome mental states cannot happen at the same time. A thought experiment shows this: Batman confronts the Joker, who plans to kill many people. Batman has taken a vow to follow the first precept and so does not kill the Joker. If the intention to kill exists, the first precept is broken, even for a hero.
II
The Mahavamsa, written by a Buddhist monk, tells of King Dutugemunu's war against King Elara. Dutugemunu expresses remorse for killing many people, but arahants (enlightened monks) console him, saying only "one and a half men" (Elara and one other) were spiritually important, suggesting others had little karmic worth. This story symbolically endorses killing to defend the Dharma.
Some interpret this as "ethical particularism", where prima facie duties can be overridden by contextual moral obligations when higher values are at stake. This creates a Buddhist justification where protecting the Dharma overrides the first precept against killing in extreme circumstances.
This logic can be formalised as follows:
• P1: Dharma is the supreme good as it leads to liberation (freedom from suffering).
• P2: Threats to the Dharma endanger this supreme good for many beings.
• P3: Preventing those threats may require killing.
• ∴ C: Therefore, killing committed in defence of the Dharma is permissible.
Central to this justification is the claim that Buddhist precepts function as prima facie duties rather than absolute values. This suggests the precept against killing can be set aside when protecting the Dharma. However, this mischaracterises Buddhist ethics. The Buddhist tradition makes clear that unwholesome mental states are absolute realities. Unlike Western ethical theories, where duties can be weighed against each other, Buddhism insists that compassion and the intention to kill simply cannot co-exist. This renders the “defence of the Dharma” justification philosophically impossible rather than morally permissible.
Interviews show that modern monks have used the Mahavamsa to justify war, notably Sri Lanka's war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). However, the Mahavamsa is a non-canonical (not included in the list of sacred books officially accepted as genuine) Buddhist text and cannot override the first precept from the canonical Pali Canon. Using narrative texts to reinterpret the first precept creates moral inconsistency in Buddhist ethics.
III
The "defence of the Dharma" justification contains three critical philosophical flaws that demonstrate it jeopardises the first precept.
First, intention's central role in the first precept means that any act of killing involves negative karma. Thus, the justification contradicts the logic of karma and intention. The mental processes involved in killing are precisely those Buddhist practice aims to overcome, making righteous killing a contradiction. Since killing involves unwholesome mental roots creating negative karma, claiming that killing to defend the Dharma has negligible karma contradicts the first precept. Therefore, P3 is flawed; one cannot kill without creating negative karma, contradicting the path to freedom from suffering.
Second, the justification equivocates the meaning of "Dharma". It conflates institutional Buddhism with the defence of the Dharma. Dharma, as impersonal truth, cannot be threatened by political situations. The Buddha predicted Dharma's disappearance as a truth independent of institutions, demonstrating P1’s flaw.
Third, the justification contradicts non-attachment. Buddhism teaches non-attachment for liberation. Treating Dharma as worth killing for encourages attachment that Buddhism seeks to overcome. The Alagaddupama Sutta compares Dharma to a raft abandoned after crossing a river. This justification hinders spiritual progress, encouraging attachment to institutional Dharma rather than liberation.
One counterargument suggests Buddhism allows flexible use of precepts based on conventional truth. However, these flaws contradict core Buddhist principles. Disregarding intention as karma's main factor, reducing Dharma to institutional Buddhism, and justifying attachment compromises the Buddhist philosophy.
I critique the ethical particularism approach, arguing it simply restates moral dualism without resolution and fails to provide a framework for overriding duties. It is analysing Buddhist war justifications through Western just war doctrine combined with Buddhist intention. However, this criticism overlooks how ethical particularism reflects Buddhism's contextual ethical reasoning. In Section IV, my "Recursive Intention" idea demonstrates how intention creates an unsolvable ethical paradox. This creates a paradox in Buddhist ethics that no just war theory can overcome, confirming the first precept's absolute nature.
IV
To explain why the "defence of the Dharma" justification fails, I propose the "Recursive Intention" thought experiment. This model suggests intentions in Buddhist ethics function recursively, creating meta-intentions (intentions about intentions) that change actions' moral status. The first precept creates a meta-intentional state, developing non-harmful intentions, making killing internally contradictory. This interpretation aligns with the Buddha's mindfulness teachings, emphasising observing intentions before, during, and after actions. The precepts function as training in developing recursive awareness of intentions. This creates what I call an “ethical feedback loop” where the commitment to non-harm reinforces itself through the mindful observation of mental states.
This paradox works as a logical contradiction: the defender of the Dharma simultaneously (1) claims to uphold the Buddhist ethical system that requires developing non-harmful mental states as meta-intentions, while (2) creating harmful first-order intentions necessary for killing. These cannot logically co-exist, as one cannot simultaneously be committed to developing non-harmful mental states as a general disposition whilst deliberately creating harmful mental states for specific actions. The contradiction operates at different logical levels, the meta-level of ethical commitment and the object-level of specific intentions, making it a recursive paradox rather than a simple inconsistency.
A counterargument could suggest rulers can kill compassionately, separating surface intentions (stopping aggression) from deeper motivations (compassion). However, early texts reject this psychological compartmentalisation. Wholesome and unwholesome mental roots cannot occur simultaneously. Deciding to kill must involve aversion or fear, making it unwholesome regardless of justification.
"Recursive Intention" explains why the "defence of the Dharma" justification undermines the first precept: it tries to interrupt the recursive process by exempting certain killing from karmic consequences, creating an "ethical recursion paradox"; a conflict between the meta-intention to develop non-harmful mental states and the first-order intention to kill.
Conclusion
The first precept’s absolute value in intention and non-harming rules out killing as permissible, even for “defence of the Dharma”. My “Recursive Intention” thought experiment highlights this contradiction as a failure of moral recursion. The "defence of the Dharma" argument fails for three reasons: it contradicts the logic of karma and intention, equivocates on the meaning of Dharma, and obstructs the path to non-attachment. Ultimately, the “defence of the Dharma” justification jeopardises the first precept.